Based on a critical analysis of the shortcomings of current policies, what recommendations would you propose for improving policy responses to climate-induced migration?
Throughout this essay, I am going to take an objective look into the issue of and policies surrounding climate-induced migration, providing insights and analysis into the failings of UN policy leading to a rise in CIM (climate-induced migration) in recent years. Climate-induced migration can be defined as “the movement of a person or groups of persons who, predominantly for reasons of sudden or progressive change in the environment due to climate change, are obliged to leave their habitual place of residence” (Schewel, 2020), and it has become an increasingly prominent issue in recent years due to the continued worsening of climate change and therefore climate-related disasters, with an estimated 31.8 million immigrants displaced in 2022 alone (House of Lords, & Weston, 2023, para.1). Due to the limited scope of climate policy to directly address climate-induced migration, these numbers are predicted to continue rising, disproportionately affecting poorer countries, as seen below. With no clear definition, retroactive policy and failing climate targets all areas of policy that should be improved.
(migration data portal,2023)
Firstly, it is important to look at what the policies that aim to tackle climate-induced migration actually are. Falling under the issue of climate change, it is useful to look at the UN policies of the 2015 Sendai Framework as well as the 2020 Paris agreement. Then, using the UK as an example, these can be analysed based on how effectively they have been implemented at a state level.
The Sendai framework aims to tackle CIM by negating the impact of climate-induced natural disasters, comprising seven key points on which LDCs (least developed countries) can be assisted. The most important aspects of this policy related to CIM are: reducing the number of people affected by these disasters; reducing damage to critical infrastructure; and reducing disruption of basic services (United Nations, 2015). Despite this not directly addressing CIM by name, these aspects of it have a clear aim of reducing the prospective number of climate immigrants caused by these disasters. And as a result of this work, as of 2022, 126 countries have reported having national disaster risk reduction strategies. This represents two-thirds of countries in the world and an increase of 130% since it was put in place (UNDRR 2022), showing a much higher number of countries that are effectively able to deal with internal climate migration, as well as the fact that this will continue to bring success as the plan is aimed to continue until 2030. However, there are still issues with the rolling out of funding for these LDCs. This is due to the fact that it is disproportionately pushed into response and recovery rather than prevention and infrastructure building, with “only 50 cents of every $100 of international assistance related to disasters is invested in prevention and risk reduction.” (United Nations office for disaster risk). This limits the effectiveness of these programmes for helping CIMs (climate-induced migrants) specifically, due to the fact that money is being spent to repair damage rather than prevent it, meaning an environmental disaster would still leave these people displaced. This therefore highlights the lack of scope of this policy, a common theme shared by many strategies aimed at CIM.
Where the previous policy aimed to prevent CIMs by addressing the issue of the aftermath of disasters themselves, the 2020 Paris agreement was more broadly aimed at the prevention of further climate change, indirectly lowering the number of disasters and therefore the number of people who are displaced by them. Climate change has become a very key issue in recent years, with large sections of the public worried about it (see below).
(Office for National Statistics,2022)
Therefore, the Paris agreement is aimed at providing a long-term solution to climate change. Its aims are to keep global warming below 2 degrees and cut greenhouse gas emissions with a five-year cycle of increasingly ambitious targets. It legally binds 196 countries (98% of all greenhouse gas emitters), giving it global significance (UN Climate Change. 2020). However, when referring to Climate-Migrants it can be argued that this is too little, too late. This is due to the fact that, despite being an issue raised at the Paris conference in 2015, there is still no official UN definition of a climate migrant in the 2020 Paris agreement, therefore making it unable to effectively help them as it has no idea what they actually are (De Jong, 2019, pg. 1). Worse still, CIMs are not even considered refugees, as “the current legal definition only refers to groups that are displaced due to “persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion." (Service, 2015, as cited in (De Jong, 2019, pg. 3). This can pose challenges for them when trying to migrate, therefore leading to further internal migration and more strain on the infrastructure of a country already affected by a climate disaster. This once again highlights the limited scope of UN policy in relation to climate migration, making it more difficult to help displaced peoples as there is no obligation under current international law, as well as an increased number of climate events increasing the cost of recovery and subsequent ability of an LDC to help climate migrants.
Building on this, it can be seen that the Paris agreement has garnered large-scale government support. An example of this is the steps taken by the UK government, which claims to have “set the most ambitious target to reduce carbon emissions by 68% by 2030 compared to 1990 levels" as well as being “the only major economy to have set a target of 77% for 2035” (Prime Minister's Office, 10 Downing Street, 2023). There is also a cross-party consensus on the need for UK climate policy, showing that the Paris agreement is having a clear effect. The knock-on effect of all this would be a reduction in the number of climate-migrants, due to reduced emissions hopefully slowing the effects of climate-change. However it has been highlighted by government advisors that the UK is missing targets on “almost every front in regards to climate change” (Harvey, 2023) , making these pledges false and simply a front by the uk government to cash in on the support for climate change measures , with 74% of adults in the UK worried about it (Office for National Statistics,2022). These failings are not solely a British problem either, with National Geographic highlighting a report made by Sir Robert Watson whereby “Countries need to double and triple their 2030 reduction commitments to be aligned with the Paris target,” (Leahy, 2019). This implies that the Paris agreement's claim of being “legally binding” is superficial as despite these failings no action has been taken by the UN. Further showing the lack of scope of UN policy as targets are simply just not being met, raising the question of if it is possible to undo the damage causing the number of climate related disasters to triple in the last 30 years (oxfam, 2023) and therefore leading to increased numbers of Climate-Migrants.
Therefore, it can be argued that current policy on climate immigration is not fit for purpose. It is obvious that policy is far too limited in relation to climate migrants specifically, with them not even being defined by the UN (De Jong, 2019, pg. 1). On top of this even the policies aiming to help these impoverished countries to build an infrastructure to deal with climate migrants is limited, with the focus on intervention rather than prevention being ignorant of victims of disasters, highlighting a need to help support these countries in being able to tackle these disasters (United Nations office for disaster risk). Climate disasters have “absorbed US$ 35 billion a year in damages” within these impoverished countries and there is no clear signs of this changing unless the infrastructure of these countries and climate change as a whole is tackled (Monirul Qader Mirza, 2003).This highlights three crucial areas in which climate-Migration policy must be adapted: Climate-migrants must be officially defined, money must go into building infrastructure to limit the damage of disasters rather than simply clean up afterward, and climate change as a whole needs to be tackled more quickly in order to prevent disasters from becoming more common and more harsh. These ideas can be seen as relating to De Jong’s six step strategy to address climate-migration, with steps one and four highlighting the need to “Develop universally accepted definitions of climate migration” and “Prioritise the urging of key decision-makers…to develop action plans on climate migration” (2019, pg.1). Showing a need of policy that defines and gives directions to actors on what to do with climate migrants. The severity of the need to tackle climate change is reinforced by Puaschunder, highlighting how climate-change “impinges on every aspect of human life” and that it is an ever-worsening problem that must be dealt with in order to prevent further climate migration which would be on a scale never seen before (Ferriea, 2018 , pg. 108).
To conclude, while not completely failing, climate policy lacks the scope to effectively deal with not only climate migration itself, but also the issue of climate change that causes it to begin with. Therefore it should be recommended that climate migrants are first of all legally recognised by the UN, funding is placed in building the infrastructure of countries to deal with climate events that cause internal migration , and that climate change as a whole is more effectively tackled before it becomes an issue too big to solve. These recommendations would tackle the shortcomings of the policy and better improve the way in which climate migrants are handled, given their numbers will continue to increase in the future.
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